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Introduction
Multilateral trade liberalisation since the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has led to an increase in the volume of world trade and an increase in the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) with many industries experiencing increases in both intra-industry trade and intra-industry FDI. 1 The increase in FDI as a result of trade liberalisation is a paradox as the standard theoretical model (the proximity-concentration trade-off model) suggests that a reduction in trade costs would reduce the amount of horizontal FDI. 2 Recently, Neary (2009) has discussed this paradox and considered possible explanations to resolve the paradox. One explanation is that economic integration by trade blocs has reduced intra-bloc trade costs and led to an increase in export-platform FDI where firms undertake FDI in one country to supply all the countries in the trade bloc. 3 However, this approach does not really explain how multilateral trade liberalisation may lead to an increase in FDI, and does not address the effect on the volume of world trade.
This note will present a model that explains how multilateral trade liberalisation (albeit in the presence of an inter-regional transport cost) can lead firms to shift from supplying markets by exporting to supplying markets by undertaking export-platform FDI when the inter-regional transport cost is high. Also, it is shown that this shift from exporting to undertaking export-platform FDI leads to an increase in the volume of world trade in this industry when the inter-regional transport cost is high. Therefore, when the inter-regional transport cost is high, this model can explain why multilateral trade liberalisation has led to an increase in FDI and an increase in the volume of world trade. Consider first the case when both firms supply all the markets by exporting from their existing factories thereby incurring the import tariff on all exports and the transport cost on inter-regional exports. In country one, firm A has marginal cost c and firm B has marginal cost c k t + + while in country three the situation is reversed. In country two, firm A has marginal cost c t + and firm B has marginal cost c k t + + while in country four the situation is reversed. Assuming an interior solution where all firms sell positive quantities in all markets, it is straightforward to show that the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs in the four markets are:
The output exported by firm A (B) to country three (one) will be positive if the sum of the import tariff and inter-regional transport cost 
Using the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs (1) to solve for the profits of the two firms in the four markets yields:
Since it is assumed that ( ) 2 k t c α + < − , both firms sell positive quantities in all markets and the profits of the firms are positive in all markets.
Foreign Direct Investment
Now consider the possibility that the firms undertake FDI by building a factory If both firms undertake inter-regional export-platform FDI, where firm A undertakes FDI in country four and firm B undertakes FDI in country two, then firm A (B) will have marginal cost c in countries one and four (two and three) where it has a factory, and it will have marginal cost c t + in countries two and three (one and four) where the product is exported from the factory in the other country in the region. It is straightforward to show that the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs are:
For future reference, when comparing the volume of world trade, note that the total exports of firm A from its factories in countries one and four (and, by symmetry, the total exports of firm B from its factories in countries two and three) are:
Using the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs (4) to solve for the gross profits (before the sunk cost, G ) of the two firms in the four markets yields: 
each firm will undertake FDI if the sunk cost of FDI is less than the critical value:
If G G < then undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both firms and both firms will undertake FDI in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. To determine how multilateral trade liberalisation affects the critical value of the sunk cost, differentiate G in (7) with respect to the import tariff, t :
This is positive if the inter-regional transport cost is low, 
Since the firms shift from exporting to undertaking FDI when the inter-regional transport cost is high, 
Conclusions
It has been shown that multilateral trade liberalisation may lead firms to shift from exporting to undertaking export-platform FDI when the inter-regional transport cost is high as it increases the profitability of undertaking FDI. This inter-regional FDI eliminates interregional trade, but leads to an increase in intra-regional, intra-industry trade. The net result, when the inter-regional transport cost is high, is that the volume of world trade in this industry increases. Therefore, this model can explain why multilateral trade liberalisation has led to an increase in FDI and an increase in the volume of world trade.
Appendix
This appendix shows that the pattern of inter-regional FDI described above is the only possibility if the sunk cost of FDI is sufficiently large.
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With intra-regional FDI, firm A could supply country two by undertaking FDI rather than exporting from country one. The profits from exporting to country two from its factory in country one are: 2 
With inter-regional FDI, firm A can either build a factory in country three, where its competitor has a factory, or in country four, where its competitor does not have a factory. The profits in country three and four for firm A from undertaking FDI in country three are:
( ) 
